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Shock events and flood risk management: a media analysis of the
institutional long-term effects of flood events in the Netherlands and Poland
Maria Kaufmann 1, Jakub Lewandowski 2, Adam Choryński 2 and Mark Wiering 1
ABSTRACT. Flood events that have proven to create shock waves in society, which we will call shock events, can open windows of
opportunity that allow different actor groups to introduce new ideas. Shock events, however, can also strengthen the status quo. We
will take flood events as our object of study. Whereas others focus mainly on the immediate impact and disaster management, we will
focus on the long-term impact on and resilience of flood risk governance arrangements. Over the last 25 years, both the Netherlands
and Poland have suffered several flood-related events. These triggered strategic and institutional changes, but to different degrees. In
a comparative analysis these endogenous processes, i.e., the importance of framing of the flood event, its exploitation by different actor
groups, and the extent to which arrangements are actually changing, are examined. In line with previous research, our analysis revealed
that shock events test the capacity to resist and bounce back and provide opportunities for adapting and learning. They “open up”
institutional arrangements and make them more susceptible to change, increasing the opportunity for adaptation. In this way they can
facilitate a shift toward different degrees of resilience, i.e., by adjusting the current strategic approach or by moving toward another
strategic approach. The direction of change is influenced by the actors and the frames they introduce, and their ability to increase the
resonance of the frame. The persistence of change seems to be influenced by the evolution of the initial management approach, the
availability of resources, or the willingness to allocate resources.
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INTRODUCTION
Flood risk is increasing; the probability of flooding is projected
to increase because of climate change. The consequences of
flooding are increasing because of ongoing socioeconomic
development in flood-prone areas (Mitchell 2003, Klijn et al.
2012, Alfieri et al. 2015). Appropriate adaptation to those changes
is regularly connected to an increase in resilience, i.e., the capacity
of society (as a whole) to resist, to absorb and recover, and to
adapt to hazards (see Hegger et al. 2016). In flood risk
management (FRM), resilience is often connected to a
diversification of strategies that address these different capacities
(Table 1; Hegger et al. 2014).
Table 1. Flood risk strategies (cf. Hegger et al. 2014).
 
Strategy Prevention Defense Mitigation Preparation Recovery
Measures Prohibition
of
construction
Dikes,
retention
basins
Flood-
adapted
infrastruc­
ture
Emergency
planning
Insurance
To increase resilience, existing flood risk governance
arrangements (FRGAs) might need to be adjusted. These FRGAs
are the institutional structures and processes that guide and
restrain collective activities of a society to regulate, reduce, or
control risks (Renn et al. 2011). Sjöstedt (2015) argues that the
endogenous, institutional dynamics of this adjustment tend to
receive little attention. We address this gap by focusing on crisis-
driven institutional dynamics (Rosenthal and 't Hart 1998). Flood
events may stabilize policies (cf. Birkland 1998, Driessen and De
Gier 1999, Boin et al. 2009), but also cause catalytic changes by
accelerating the policy change process (cf. Baumgartner and Jones
1993, Kingdon 1995, Lowry 2006). For example, flood events in
England opened windows of opportunity that accelerated the
implementation of pre-event ideas (Johnson et al. 2005, Penning-
Rowsell et al. 2006).  
We aim to analyze the influence of shock events on the
transformation toward different forms of resilience. However, the
relation between shock events and resilience has received little
attention in the resilience literature until now (Olsson et al. 2006,
Chaffin et al. 2014) with a number of exceptions (e.g., Solecki and
Rosenzweig 2014). To analyze the effect of the shock event on the
FRGA, we chose a framing perspective. Research on framing is
widely spread to analyze political mobilization and social
movements (e.g., Snow and Benford 1988, Dewulf et al. 2005,
Vink et al. 2013, Metze 2014), yet combining exogenous shock
events with an endogenous framing perspective to understand
institutional change is a relatively new approach.  
We explore this relation by analyzing two case study countries:
the Netherlands and Poland. Focusing on only two countries
enables us to conduct an in-depth analysis of the framing
processes and institutional dynamics. Compared with other
countries in the research project STARFLOOD, the Netherlands
and Poland show the following similarities: a strong role for
government, a traditional focus on a hydro-engineering flood
defense approach, and the occurrence of flood events with effect
on the FRGA. Differences between the two countries include the
degree of institutionalization of the FRGA and the resource
availability for FRM (Kaufmann et al. 2016, Matczak et al. 2016).
By having comparable management approaches as starting
points, but different degrees of institutionalization, we can shed
more light on the institutional dynamics triggered by the shock
event.  
Our aim is to contribute to the resilience and flood risk governance
literature by analyzing the role of shock events on policy
1Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 2Institute for Agricultural and Forest Environment, Polish
Academy of Sciences, Poznan, Poland
Ecology and Society 21(4): 51
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art51/
evolution. Therefore, we conducted a longitudinal analysis that
investigated the influence of events on FRGAs. We distinguish
between short-term (from a few months up to 5 years after the
shock event), midterm (5–10 years), and long-term effect (15–20
years). We have analyzed the following research questions: How
have (near) flood events been framed in the Netherlands and
Poland between 1990 and 2014 at the national level? What are the
most dominant frames that can be found in the media and in
political documents? What factors facilitated the resonance of
those frames, including framing strategies? What is the role of the
existing governance arrangement in facilitating or hampering
change? How did the event affect national governance
arrangements? How persistent is this change?
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
To understand the effect of events on FRGAs, we developed a
conceptual framework that links events to both an (agency-
focused) framing perspective and a more (structure-based)
institutional perspective (cf. Giddens 1984). We used these
concepts to guide our empirical research.  
We understand a shock event as a focusing event (Kingdon 1995,
Birkland 1998) that has created considerable stress waves in a
society. Birkland defines a potential focusing event as “an event
that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined
as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future
harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular
geographical area or community of interest; and that is known
to policy makers and the public simultaneously” (1998:54). That
implies that such an event does not necessarily need to cause harm,
but already its potential to cause harm is sufficient to cause
institutional change. With shock events we want to emphasize the
fact that the event has already had a certain effect (created shock
waves in society) on the media, the politicians, and the public, and
this is the starting point to assess what kind of effect the event
had, and to what extent it is a long lasting effect. We obviously
make intensive use of the vocabulary of Kingdon (1995) who sees
policy change and dynamics in terms of separate streams of
problems, policies, and politics that come together at critical times.
“Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are
joined to favorable political forces. This coupling is most likely
when policy windows—opportunities for pushing pet proposals
or conceptions of problems—are open” (Kingdon 1995:20).
Focusing events like crisis or disaster call attention to the problem
(or problems), change the perception of the problem, though
perhaps temporary, change the urgency of political action, and
possibly change policies in the long term. Policy windows can be
of short duration, but can also cast long shadows (Zahariadis
2014). Events can function as early warnings, that might announce
structural problems, and aggregated disasters can have important
public policy effects (Kingdon 1995), but problems could also
fade away again, after people may feel they have solved the
problem, after they were addressed by government, through
(perhaps symbolic) legislation, or sometimes merely because
people do not welcome suggested changes (climate change and
reducing private emissions) or lose their interest and enthusiasm
for addressing the problem (Kingdon, 1995). In any case, policy
windows can open, but also close at a certain point in time. It is
important to focus on what happens in the meantime, and one
important strategy of policy entrepreneurs is the meaning-
making and framing processes following the event.  
The simple occurrence of an event is not sufficient for institutional
change. Big or small events happen all the time. It is the way actors
frame the event as a disaster that decides its institutional effect.
Again, events are always framed in some way, either to give them
meaning or to classify them as meaningless (Crotty 1998).
Framing describes a schema that allows individuals “to locate,
perceive, identify and label” occurrences in life (Goffman
1974:21). The way actors frame an event is determined by the
overarching discourses that influence how actors understand the
world (Van den Brink 2009). In the realm of policies and politics,
this means actor groups differ in the way they frame a shock event
to alter the political support for policies and further their own
ideas. A framing contest takes place between status quo players
that resist or aim to contain policy change, and change agents
that press for a policy paradigm shift or incremental reform (Boin
et al. 2009). We apply Snow and Benford's (1988) core framing
tasks to identify and analyze the activities of different actor
coalitions: diagnostic framing, which is the process of identifying
the problem, connected causalities, and the responsible actors to
blame; prognostic framing, which is the process of proposing a
general solution to that problem; and motivational framing,
which is the process of offering action frames, in the form of
concrete policy options (cf. Lindekilde 2014, Crabbé et al. 2015;
Table 2). In other words, framing a shock event enables the actor
to link the problem stream to the solution (policy) stream, a
process, which is influenced by the political stream.
Table 2. Description of the core framing tasks (cf. Lindekilde
2014).
 
Diagnostic framing Prognostic framing Motivational framing
Identification of the
problem and the
attribution of blame
and causality
Proposed solution to
the identified problem.
The indication of
strategies, tactics, and
goals
Indication of policy
options
Example:
“People living in the
flood plain is the
reason for severe
damage.”
“We need to leave the
floodplains, otherwise
the number of
casualties will
increase.”
“Municipalities should
have the possibility to
force people to relocate
by expropriating land.”
The question arises how actors can further their preferred
solution, i.e., increase the resonance and credibility of their frame.
This can be done by aligning their frames to the discursive
opportunity structure, i.e., hegemonic discourses, or to frames
belonging to hegemonic discourses, that are seen as sensible and
legitimate. For example, climate change is a widely accepted
discourse, so framing an event as a warning of climate change will
increase its resonance. The discursive opportunity structure can
be more stable, i.e., hegemonic over a long period, or more volatile
over a shorter time. Correspondingly, the resonance of a frame
might be more long-lasting or temporary (McCammon et al.
2007). From the literature we can identify different alignment
strategies (Benford and Snow 2000). Frame bridging is defined
by Benford and Snow (2000:624) as the “linking of two or more
ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames
regarding a particular issue,” e.g., linking the frame to other
popular trends, like sustainability or climate change. Frame
amplification is the idealization, embellishment, or strengthening
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of existing values and beliefs (Benford and Snow 2000), e.g.,
reinforcing values of safety. Frame extension is the broadening
of the frame to incorporate concerns important for potential
support, e.g., combining the protection of fish with the protection
of beavers. Frame transformation is the changing of old
understandings and meanings by generating new meanings
(Benford and Snow 2000), e.g., framing a dike, not in terms of
safety, but in terms of adverse ecological impacts to delegitimize
engineering approaches.  
The framing of a shock event takes place within an existing
governance arrangement. Arrangements can differ in their degree
of stability and the corresponding susceptibility to change
(Blowers and Leroy 2003, Boonstra 2004, Crabbé 2008, Mahoney
and Thelen 2009). If  a flood event is framed as a shock event, it
opens up the arrangement by creating a window of opportunity
that makes the arrangement more susceptible to new ideas and
potential policy change. Windows can be of short duration, but
can also cast long shadows. We apply the policy arrangement
approach (PAA) to map out the key structures of the institutional
arrangement preshock event, as well as the changes corresponding
to the shock event. The PAA analyzes an institutional subsystem
in terms of four dimensions: its formal and informal rules, the
involved actor coalitions, their resource and power positions, and
dominant policy discourses (Liefferink 2006, Wiering and Arts
2006). Thus, it facilitates the identification of policy change: Is
policy change mainly of a rhetorical/symbolic nature, or does it
affect one or more of the organizational dimensions, i.e., the actor
constellation and the rules or resources-dimension (Liefferink
2006, Wiering and Arts 2006)? The change can be more lastingly
stabilized in the form of legislation or permanent authorities. It
can also be more temporary in the form of short-term policy
programs or interim working groups. Research steps are
summarized in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Research steps per event and per country. FRGA =
flood risk governance arrangement.
METHODS
Case selection
The influence of shock events on FRGAs was explored
empirically in a comparative case study analysis of the
Netherlands and Poland. In both countries, we chose particular
shock events. For the Netherlands, it was the public debate
surrounding the flood experience of 1993 and 1995. Both events
occurred in such a short period of time that they were afterward
often referred to in a combined way. In Poland, it was the political
debate following the flood events of 1997 and 2010.
Data selection
The research is embedded into a broader research project:
STARFLOOD. Within the project a longitudinal analysis of the
dynamics in the FRGA in the Netherlands and Poland was carried
out over a period of 25 years, which was deemed sufficient to
assess long-term institutional change. This analysis consisted of
an extensive literature study of legal and policy documents, over
40 semistructured interviews, and three regional case studies in
both countries (Kaufmann et al. 2016, Matczak et al. 2016). It
provided background information that supplements our
understanding.  
A media analysis was carried out to explore the discursive space
and identify framing packages (see Gamson and Modigliani
1989). In the Dutch context we chose three national newspapers
for our analysis, namely Trouw, NRC, and AD which cover a broad
political spectrum from socio-democratic, to liberal-academic,
and to conservative. We used the database LexisNexis to search
those newspapers for articles that included at least one of the
following search terms (in Dutch): flooding, high water,
evacuation, water nuisance, or dike breach, as well as one of these
terms: Rhine, Meuse, or Waal, which are rivers in Europe. We
chose search terms that yielded a wide range of newspaper articles
and that were suitable for both countries. From 1992 to 1996 we
analyzed articles every year, and afterward we adopted a two-year
interval until 2014, for feasibility reasons. Figure 2 illustrates the
number of analyzed articles per year. The effect of the shock event
of 1995 produced the greatest number of articles.
Fig. 2. Number of articles per year in the Netherlands.
In Poland, we also worked with nationwide, digital newspaper
archives. We chose the archive with the greatest number of records
over the longest time period, i.e., 1993–2014. Only two newspapers
were digitally available: Gazeta Wyborcza (GW), a somewhat
liberal newspaper, and Rzeczpospolita (RZ), a more conservative
newspaper. The keywords flood, Odra, and Vistula (rivers in
Poland) identified the most relevant articles (Fig. 3). Having two
instead of three newspapers was not seen as a problem as long as
a broad political spectrum was covered.
Fig. 3. Number of articles per year in Poland.
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To improve the correspondence between a frame and the
identified policy change, we also analyzed parliamentary
discussions and policy documents. When using the parliamentary
archives we searched with the same search terms as for the media
analysis in both countries. Because of space constraints we focus
on frames that are present in the media and the parliamentary
documents at the national level.
Data analysis
On the basis of the core framing tasks, the material was coded.
Thus, in a first step we coded the newspaper articles, and in a
second step we coded the policy documents. We used the
conceptual codes (see Table 1) deductively, but refined these initial
codes inductively based on the empirical findings (like Lindekilde
2014). We differentiated between frames based on the core
framing tasks and the FRM strategy they described (i.e.,
prevention, defense, mitigation, preparation, and recovery), or if
they described a specific FRM measure within a strategy (e.g.,
private insurance or public compensation within the strategy of
recovery), or if  they described specific governance characteristics
(e.g., public responsibility or private responsibility).  
To systematize the analysis, we used software programs, atlas.ti
in the Netherlands and nvivo in Poland. The use of different
software programs was not seen as a problem because we applied
the same conceptual codes. To increase the reproducibility, we
decided to focus on the most dominant frames, i.e., the frames
that came up most often in quotations, in both the media analysis
and in the analysis of political documents.
RESULTS
The Netherlands
FRM in the Netherlands is traditionally characterized by a sector-
based, hydro-technical flood defense approach (Van de Ven 2004,
Van Heezik 2006). This approach is highly institutionalized with
safety standards and specialized governmental authorities (see
Table 3; Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). During the 1970s
environmental concerns gained importance with actors
advocating these ideas (Schwartz 1993, Disco 2002, Lintsen 2005).
The policy concept “Integrated Water Management” was
introduced in 1989 in “The 3rd National Policy Document on
Water Management.” It described a more ecological and
comprehensive manner of water management including several
policy sectors. Projects were developed to integrate nature and
water development, e.g., Plan Stork (Plan Ooievaar, 1986) and
Living Rivers (Levende Rivieren, 1992; Disco 2002, Van den Brink
2009).  
Preceding the flood events, the media analysis revealed that the
flood defense approach was increasingly criticized because of its
negative effects on the environment and cultural (river) landscape,
and adverse social impacts, i.e. destruction of settlements.
Societal, environmental, and nature conservation groups opposed
extensive dike strengthening in favor of cultural and
environmental values. They appealed against dike strengthening
by going, for example, to the European court forcing the
application of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) when
carrying out defense measures (Van Eten 1997). In contrast, the
governmental water managers stressed the necessity of defense
structures to provide safety, also along the rivers.
Table 3. Characteristics of the Dutch flood risk governance
arrangement (FRGA) before the flood event of 1993.
 
Characteristics of
the FRGA
The Netherlands
Discourse
(hegemonic)
Hydro-technical discourse (“Safety first! Engineering
measures offer protection”)
Rules Strict national safety standards in policy
Actors Specialized national and regional water managers
High level of expertise
Power/Resources National subsidies and specialized regional taxes
Politically, flooding was not a high priority. Nevertheless, an
advisory committee (Boertien I), was installed to study the future
of FRM. The committee stressed the importance of public
support, the preservation of LNC-values (landscape, nature, and
culture), and the need for obligatory EIA. It supported new ideas
of integrating water and nature development, but stated that dike
reinforcement was always necessary (Commissie Boertien I 1993).
First shock event: flood of December 1993
In December 1993, high water levels in the Meuse and Rhine led
to flooding in the southern province of Limburg resulting in the
evacuation of 8000 people and €122 million damages (Van den
Ven 2004, Warner 2008). Table 4 summarizes three dominant
frames that were found in the analysis: “prodike strengthening”
opposing “additional study” and “spatial planning.” Marginally,
emergency management and private insurance were also
discussed, but they were mentioned less often, which implies little
resonance. Furthermore, they were either limited to a more
localized operational issue and not a national policy issue, i.e.,
emergency management, or they were only peripherally
connected to flooding, and more the result of other events, e.g.,
a discussion on insurance as a reaction to an earthquake.  
The media analysis revealed that affected citizens, regional
governments, and regional water authorities framed the event as
a serious crisis demanding immediate action in the form of dike
strengthening. They blamed the interest groups that delayed dike
strengthening (frame: prodike strengthening). However, the
resonance of the frame was limited because the flood event stayed
a regional issue. Correspondingly, Rijkswaterstaat (the national
water authority) and the Minister of Transport and Water framed
the flood event as a minor nuisance with only material damages.
Furthermore, scientific experts stressed that the hydro-
engineering situation along the Meuse was difficult to manage.
Because of the gravel soil it would be costly, more costly than the
current damages, or potentially even impossible to prevent water
passing under the dike. Further research was needed to analyze
the feasibility and costs of management measures (frame:
additional study). The resonance of the frame was increased
because these experts had a high credibility and connections to
the Minister of Transport and Water, but also in the media this
frame was supported. Additionally, the legitimacy of local actors,
like municipalities and the province, was decreased by the media
and national politicians, among others the Minister of Transport
and Water, who framed the event as a shortcoming of spatial
planners that permitted the construction in the flood plain
causing the event (frame: spatial planning shortcoming).  
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Table 4. Overview of frames identified after the flood of 1993 with representative quotations (1993–1995). FRM = flood risk
management.
 
Frames
Diagnostic Prognostic Motivational
Additional study,
e.g., National level water managers, media (NRC), historic, insurance
Event was water nuisance, less a serious crisis.
National Water manager: “We don’t call it
flooding. The damage of a dike breach is 15
billion Guilders, but in Limburg the damage
was only 100 million Guilders.” (Trouw, 7
December 1994)
Difficult situation, feasibility of constructing
dikes is limited in Limburg.
Minister: “It is impossible to prevent flooding
on the Meuse completely. Local problems
could be solved, but that would increase the
water level at other places.” (political
discussions, 9 March 1994)
 
Setting up committee to investigate possibilities
of FRM along the Meuse.
Minister: “This committee must give advice
regarding the possible measures to limit water
nuisance.” (political discussions, 9 March 1994)
Prostructural defense,
e.g., regional water managers, some politicians
Serious event, due to lack of dike strengthening
because of discussions and nature protests.
Regional water managers: “All the discussions
cause delay in the implementation.” (NRC, 24
December 1993)
Dike strengthening.
Politician: “The event emphasizes the
importance of dikes for the country” (political
discussion, 9 March 1994)
Decreased delay through appeals because of
improved cooperation of different parties.
Minister: “Public participation and
consultation requires more time in initial phase,
but number of appeals decreased, which will
decrease delays. All parties need to work
together in a constructive manner.” (political
discussions, 9 March 1994)
 
Spatial planning shortcoming,
e.g., Minister of Infrastructure and Environment, scientists, media
Construction in floodplains, indirect blame of
provinces and municipalities.
Media: “The question remains who approved
all those developments in the low-lying areas?
Which authorities are responsible, and what
does it mean for the future?” (NRC, 31
December 1993)
Taking potential measures in spatial planning
sphere.
Scientist: “Damage can be reduced through
measures in the realm of spatial planning, e.g.,
no construction in flood-prone areas, or only in
a manner that decreases damage, or adapting
existing buildings.' (AD, 4 January 1994)
Committee to develop measures to decrease
consequences of flooding.
Minister: “Awaiting the advice of the
committee, I expect a restraint on construction
in the floodplain.” (political discussion, 11 May
1994)
Eventually, in typical Dutch tradition, an advisory committee
(Boertien II) was installed to study potential management
measures (Warner 2008). The advice focused on river-widening
and river-deepening measures, combined with nature restoration
and gravel extraction. The advice was more in favor of these
measures because environmental groups had already
implemented such measures in the last decades along the Meuse
demonstrating the advantage and feasibility of this approach
(Van Heezik 2006). If  these measures were not sufficient then
embankments would be necessary (Commissie Boertien II 1994).
Second shock event: flood of January 1995
The second flood event, of January 1995, was a more prominent
event affecting the rivers Meuse, Rhine, and Waal: 250,000 people
had to be evacuated along the River Waal and 13,000 along the
River Meuse. Afterward, it was remarked that the evacuation was
not always necessary (Van Heezik 2006). This indicates the high
shock effect of the event. According to Rosenthal (1988), the
shock effect is increased when a society feels invulnerable to
flooding, which was the case in the Netherlands, where major
flooding had been prevented by extensive defense structures.
Whereas in 1993 it was argued that the flooding was “not as bad
as in 1953,” the media aligned the event of 1995 with the storm
surge of 1953. The event affected national policy (Rosenthal and
't Hart 1998, Driessen and De Gier 1999, Wiering and Driessen
2001). Table 5 summarizes the dominant frames: the
“prostructural defense” frame opposed to the “ecosystem-based
approach” and “prevention through spatial planning” frames.
This created a high political pressure to act and opened a window
of opportunity (Meijerink 2005).  
Provincial politicians, hydro-engineers of governmental water
authorities, and affected citizens quickly adopted a prodike
strengthening frame that blamed the flood on the delay of dike
strengthening caused by environmental protesters and
bureaucratic procedures, e.g., EIA. Provincial politicians, e.g.,
Commissioner of the Queen in Gelderland, Jan Terlouw, lobbied
actively for this frame at the national level, i.e., the Prime Minister.
Hydraulic-engineers within Rijkswaterstaat were quick to develop
a plan to strengthen embankments. They were in the right venue,
i.e., the ministry, with enough credibility to lobby for this plan.
Because of the political pressure for fast solutions, the Prime
Minister promised to develop a Delta Plan and an Emergency
Act to speed up decision making on dike enforcement. The use
of the word “delta” functioned as frame bridging because it
connected the frame to the prestigious Delta Committee that had
developed a successful program after the disastrous storm surge
of 1953 to secure the habitability of the country. The proponents
of the frame highlighted values of safety during the crisis, which
increased the resonance of the frame (frame amplification). The
corresponding institutional consequences are summarized in
Table 6. Several laws were indeed enacted to accelerate the
strengthening of dikes: the Delta Plan Major Rivers (1995) that
suspended EIA procedures and the long-term Flood Defense Act
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Table 5. Overview of frames identified after the flood of 1995 with representative quotations (1995–2014).
 
Frames
Diagnostic Prognostic Motivational
Prostructural defense,
e.g., government officials (especially province and water board)
Delay of dike improvement due to lack of legal
strength, blaming of interest groups.
Provincial official: “The country is
ungovernable, because the individual interest is
put above the collective interest of security.”
(AD, 30 January 1995)
 
Strengthening dikes is priority, avoid delay.
Politician: “The need for dike reinforcement is
clear when you see such scenes on television.”
(NRC, 30 January 1995)
Accelerate dike raising through Emergency Act.
Minister “The need for emergency legislation to
facilitate and shorten the planning and
participation procedure is necessary.” (political
discussions, 4 February 1995)
Ecosystem-based approach,
e.g., Nature organizations, some politicians, Minister
Human interference in hydrological processes,
e.g., channelization or dikes, or meteorological
processes, e.g., climate change.
Nature organization: “In recent centuries, the
technocrats have restrained the river. The
calamities of today are a result of a too far-
reaching desire to dominate.” (NRC, 2
February 1995)
Sustainable flood risk management, finding
more ecosystem-based solutions to give room
to the river.
National water manager: “The river system
should have a more natural character. Rain
must infiltrate the soil, so water comes
gradually into the river. Moreover, the river
should have more room to keep the damage
from high water within limits.” (NRC, 31
October 1996)
 
Stimulate river widening measures.
Politician: “The cabinet had asked for an
adaptation of the normative water level, to
avoid new dike strengthening after 2000, the
Minister did not agree, because she thinks the
solution needs to be found in river widening
measures.” (political discussion, 13 November
1996)
Prevention through spatial planning
e.g., Scientists, international, water managers
Spatial planning in floodplains increased
vulnerability and decreased retention capacity
of soil.
Scientists: “The flooding in the Meuse is the
consequence of shortcomings in planning:
building in the floodplain.” (AD, 25 February
1995)
Stop increase of vulnerable areas through
urbanization.
EU politician: “They argue that further
urbanization in vulnerable areas along these
rivers needs to stop. A construction ban needs
to be considered.” (AD, 6 February 1995)
Restrict construction in floodplain.
Minister: “Activities that are necessary (bridges
etc.) are still allowed if  they fulfil certain
preconditions. Houses should not be built
anyway, if  it can be avoided.” (Trouw, 19
December 1996)
(1996) that included the consideration of LNC-values, showing
the influence of the environmental groups. In conclusion, the
existing flood defense approach was further formalized.  
However, the media analysis showed that the support for dike
strengthening decreased again after the first shock waves and first
legal and practical responses. In the last decades preceding the
shock events, the environmental coalition was very active. For
example, Ed Nijpels, the chair of World Wide Fund, had actively
lobbied for the integration of water and nature (Huitema and
Meijerink 2009). Because of the critique on the engineering
approach of Rijkswaterstaat with its negative environmental and
cultural consequences, other professions besides engineers had
entered the organization to facilitate the integration of water and
nature. Biologists like Henk Saijs, or green engineers like Wim
Silva and Pieter Huisman received important functions within
Rijkswaterstaat, so that next to the hydraulic-engineering
community an ecological strand also developed. Close
cooperation between hydraulic-engineers and ecologists
developed (Roth et al. 2006). After the flood, this environmental
coalition dared to question whether the traditional defense
approach was fit for the future or if  it would only increase risks
by modifying natural process and creating a false sense of security,
which would demand continuous dike strengthening. Inspired by
Plan Stork, nature organizations, e.g., Frans Vera of
Staatsbosbeheer, developed radical environmental visions of river
corridors (see Staatsbosbeheer 2003; frame: ecosystem-based
approach). The legitimacy of these questions and thereby the
resonance of this frame was increased because the two flood
events were not seen as isolated incidents but conceived to be
potentially part of a larger trend: climate change (frame
extension), which demanded new management approaches
because the dike could not be strengthened forever (frame
transformation). Coincidently, the Dutch meteorological institute
(KNMI) had just published climate change projections in 1995
supporting the credibility of this concern (Roth et al. 2006). The
resonance of the frame was also increased because it aligned with
international developments. On the international level politicians
and scientists stressed that urbanization and the resulting
increased damage potential had contributed to the severity of the
event asking for a more integral management approach (frame:
prevention through spatial planning). This aligned with and
increased the credibility of the ecosystem-based frame (cf.
Huitema and Meijerink 2009). Both frames were supported by
minister Jorritsma (Transport and Water) and De Boer (Housing,
Spatial Planning and Environment). The ministers supported the
frames because they aligned with a broader discourse on
sustainability (frame bridging), which was supported by the
society and the liberal-social democratic government, thus
offering a discursive opportunity structure. Eventually,
Rijkswaterstaat was tasked by the minister to explore the
possibilities for river-widening projects.  
The corresponding institutional consequences of the frames are
summarized in Table 6. The policy guideline Room for the River
corresponds with the prevention through spatial planning frame,
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because it prohibits construction in the floodplain. The major
policy project Room for the River, a project with substantial
financial budgets and new cooperation agreements between
different governmental actors, corresponds to the ecosystem-
based approach frame. Room for the River reflects a compromise.
Even though, the shift is described as fundamental “the emphasis
shifts from dike improvement to river-widening. Dike
improvement would only be used when other measures are not
feasible or cannot be financed” (PKB 2006:7), the ideas are less
radical than foreseen by the environmental coalition. Fulfilling
safety standards by controlling the water and keeping it away from
people with hydro-engineering measures is still at the core of the
policy. Despite the advocacy work of the environmental coalition,
the need to fulfill stringent safety regulations gave power positions
to hydro-engineers. This indicates that the policy changes are
influenced by the interaction of agency and structure.
Table 6. Institutional consequences after the flood of 1995.
 
Dimensions
PAA
First response Second response
Discourses Hydro-technocratic
discourse (frame:
accelerated dike
strengthening)
Integrated water resource
management
(frame: prevention through spatial
planning, and ecosystem-based
approach)
Rules Delta Plan Great Rivers
Emergency Act Great
Rivers
Flood Protection Act
Policy guideline Room for the
River
Project Room for the River
(because the policy guideline itself
is not an instrument to implement
measures)
Actors No major changes in
responsibilities
Increased importance of
decentralized authorities.
Integration with spatial planning
was increased
Resources National government
contributes to the dike
strengthening measures
€2.3 billion from 2006–2015 and
investment by regions in spatial
quality
Persistence of policy consequences
The media analysis revealed that over the years the initial
awareness of flood risks due to the shock event declined and the
pressure by municipalities and provinces to grow economically
became stronger. According to Kingdon (1995), the policy
window had closed and the political stream started to prioritize
other issues. So, the successor to the policy guideline Room for
the River, which is called the Policy Guideline Major Rivers, is
less restrictive and offers once again more possibilities to build in
the floodplain (V&W and VROM 2006). Thus, the slight shift
toward a prevention strategy was weakened.  
Additionally, the societal and political discursive opportunity
structure changed again at the beginning of the 21st century
because of political changes toward a center right government.
This government reduced the financial means available for nature
development, thus the support for ecosystem-based solutions
started to decline. Because of the economic crisis, efficiency
gained in importance, which increased the support for structural
defense measures. A national water manager summed it up: “In
1995, we chose to give more room to the river. But that does not
seem to be enough, the Netherlands just need dikes” (Trouw, 16
September 2014). Although river widening measures are still
mentioned in the Delta Program in 2014 (a climate adaptation
program that developed a vision for Dutch FRM for future
decades), €8 billion are to be invested in dike strengthening from
2015 to 2028, while only €200 million are reserved for river
widening (I&M and EZ 2014). Civil servants evaluated this
amount as sufficient, whereas nature organizations were more
critical (Klimaatbuffers 2015). To sum up, the shift toward an
ecosystem-based defense approach lost support in the long term
and the structural defense approach restrengthened its dominance
because it had been strongly institutionalized.
Poland
For most of its history water and FRM in Poland have been
dominated by a hydro-technical approach characterized by dikes,
drainage, and reservoirs. During the Communist era, efficiency
and environmental values were less important when deciding on
investments; hydrological expertise was the key and was
institutionally embedded (Majewski 2011). Since the 1980s water
and FRM have been losing political and financial support. After
the Iron Curtain fell and the systematic transformation after
1989/1990 was underway, a different administrative context was
established. During this time, other aspects like water quality got
more attention than FRM. As a result, technical expertise and
financial support for FRM declined (Kindler et al. 2014, Matczak
et al. 2016). Table 7 summarizes the main characteristics of the
Polish FRGA. However, the hydro-technical approach is less
institutionalized and more fragmented than in the Netherlands.
Table 7. Characteristics of the Polish flood risk governance
arrangement (FRGA) before the flood event of 1997.
 
Characteristics of the
FRGA
Poland
Discourse
(hegemonic)
Hydro-technical discourse (engineering measures
offer protection)
Rules Fragmented legislation
No legal safety standards
Actors National, provincial, and regional water managers,
i.e., fragmentation of competencies
Since 1990 a decrease in well-trained engineers
Power/Resources Water managers dependent on national resources,
limited availability of financial resources
First shock event: flood of 1997
The flood of July 1997 inundated about 2% of Polish territory
and caused losses of around €3 billion and 55 fatalities (Choryński
et al. 2012). The severe consequences were the result of record
water levels and inappropriate management infrastructure. The
event was immediately labeled “the flood of the Millennium,”
which emphasizes its function as a shock event. It increased the
interest of politicians and the media in flood risks. Table 8
summarizes the dominant frames: prostructural defense, crisis
management, and decentralization.  
National politicians, including the Polish Prime Minister
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and other members of parliament
adopted the prostructural defense frame, which was, as a result,
the most dominantly represented in political documents.
Members of Parliament (MPs) shared the idea that hydro-
technical measures have the capacity to effectively stop future
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Table 8. Overview of frames identified after the flood of 1997 with representative quotations. FRM = flood risk management.
 
Frames
Diagnostic Prognostic Motivational
Prostructural defense,
e.g., Politicians, media
Lack of flood infrastructure.
Minister: “I take full responsibility for these
words: it was impossible to deal with such a
flood. The only thing possible was to minimize
flood losses.“ (GW, 17 July 1997)
Hydro-technical solutions can minimize flood
risk effectively.
Prime Minister: “Despite too few water
reservoirs, the existing reservoirs passed their
test. Thus, it is the question not “how” but
“when” we should build additional reservoirs in
the future.” (political discussion, 16 July 1997)
Increasing availability of financial means.
Politician: “It is obvious that financial
resources dedicated to Water Management
Boards, responsible for maintenance and
reconstruction of dikes, are too low and should
be increased.” (political documents, 30
September 1998)
Crisis management,
e.g., Politicians, media
Ad hoc crisis management (rescue and recovery
actions) with insufficient technological and
financial capacities to deal with crises
effectively.
Minister: “We have no crisis management
coordination center, a lack of digital data
support, computers and undeveloped
infrastructure, to effectively communicate risks
to society.” (GW, 17 July 1997)
Complementary crisis management system
needs to be established.
Politician: “From the government side it is
complementary crisis management action that
was lacking during the flood.” (GW, 5 August
1997)
Establishment of crisis management
institutions (including legislation and funding).
Scientist: “Before the flood we had started to
build emergency and warning infrastructure
and meanwhile the flood occurred
unexpectedly. Fire Brigades have been funded
even before the flood and they passed the test.
Now it is time to invest in these structures more
rapidly.” (GW, 20 August 1997)
Decentralization.
e.g., Politicians, media, citizens
State unveiled ineffectiveness in dealing with
high water flows.
Media: “Policemen, soldiers, even priests can
fail but the State cannot. However, in fact, the
State failed entirely.” (GW, 26 July 1997)
Local and regional level of administration
should be established and more included in
FRM.
Politician: “Flood of 1997 unveiled the role of
local and regional government. This event
definitely provided arguments for a need for
decentralization processes that have to be
done.” (political document, 16 July 1997)
Decentralization process of FRM.
Politician: “The ruling coalition had 4 years
and all the proper instruments to introduce
administrative reform. The only reason why
they did not do this were vested interests - in
order to sustain the political coalition.” (GW, 8
September 1997)
flood losses and even more skeptical politicians (e.g., Zbigniew
Sobotka, vice-minister of Internal Affairs), admitted that flood
defense infrastructure can be quite effective in minimizing flood
losses. The resonance of this frame was high because it was
amplified by the already dominant hydro-technocratic discourse,
so that technical solutions were instantly seen as the best solution.
The previous shortcomings of these measures were mainly
attributed to the lack of availability of financial means, while the
shortcomings in the institutional organization of defense
management were barely discussed. As a consequence more
financial means were temporarily made available for flood
infrastructure (see Table 9).  
In the crisis management frame, politicians and the media blamed
the state and its administrative structures for the high number of
fatalities because they were seen as ineffective in providing
appropriate flood warnings and organizing appropriate crisis
management. This frame was supported both by politicians (e.g.,
Krzysztof Janik, Under-secretary of State for self-government
affairs) and by influential hydrotechnical experts (e.g., Prof.
Janusz Zalewski, head of the national Programme for the River
Odra - 2006 that was developed after the flood of 1997). The
resonance of this frame was amplified for two reasons. First, its
importance was enhanced by the media that focused on the
tragedies of the citizens, who also blamed the state. Second, its
resonance was increased because proponents, such as the
influential self-government experts Prof. Michał Kulesza and
politician Hanna Suchocka (former Prime Minister), bridged the
Table 9. Institutional consequences after the flood of 1997. PAA
= policy arrangement approach.
 
Dimensions
PAA
First response Second response
Discourses Prodike strengthening:
hydro-technocratic
discourse remained
dominant
Crisis management to mitigate
flooding
Rules New programs to
implement structural
measures (ad hoc)
Act on Crisis Management 2007
(direct)
Act on Natural Disaster 2002
(direct)
Administration reform 1999
(indirect)
Actors No change More competences for
decentralized actors (state fire
brigades, local government units)
Resources Increase in outlays of
fixed assets (both from
state budget and World
Bank)
Increase in state fire brigades
budget
crisis management frame to the general discourse of
decentralization. This widely spread discourse criticized that not
enough power and responsibilities were given to the local and
regional governments after the end of the Communist era.
Additionally, decentralization of some sectors, e.g., crisis
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Table 10. Overview of frames identified after the flood of 2010 with representative quotations.
 
Frame
Diagnostic Prognostic Motivational
Prostructural defense,
e.g., water management, municipalities, citizens,
politicians, national level
Poor condition of flood defense infrastructure
because of underinvestment and protests from
local citizens.
Provincial politician: “This year we have
received only 7.5% of what we need (...). With
such funding one cannot properly maintain
dikes.” (GW, 18 May 2010)
 
The need for improving communication with
landowners, prioritization of financial means
for flood defense.
Water manager: “Communication with people
that were to be dislocated failed.” (GW, 19 May
2010)
Facilitate implementation of structural defense
by developing special legislation to buy land.
Politician: “We need a special Act to facilitate
the implementation of dikes and reservoirs.”
(GW, 21 May 2010)
Prevention through spatial planning,
e.g., Politicians, regional water management bodies, media
Lack of flood risk awareness by citizens, lack
of proper legislation.
Water manager: “People too often decide to
build or to buy a house in the flood prone
area.” (GW, 17 January 2015)
Municipalities have to have stronger powers to
include flood risk areas in their plans.
Politician: “One cannot wonder that people
want to build houses, but municipalities have to
have regulations that would force builders to
include flood risk.” (GW, 21 May 2010)
 
Legislation prohibiting constructing new
developments in flood prone areas.
Media: “Next week an amendment to the
Water Act that prohibits construction in flood
prone areas will be submitted.” (GW, 22 May
2010)
Ecosystem-based approach,
e.g., NGOs, national level water bodies, media (GW)
Flood is a serious threat because of widespread
human interference and infrastructural flood
defense.
Nature organization: “Such large losses are
caused inter alia by building dikes.” (GW, 17
January 2015)
Eliminating floods is not always possible, need
to reduce losses.
Media: “Flood defense infrastructure does not
always give security. Flood is a natural event
and it would be best if  we understood at last
that one cannot prevent a flood, only reduce
losses” (GW, 19 May 2010).
Including this new strategy in the Flood Risk
Management Plans, to reach the aim of flood
security with the least costs to bear.
Nature organizations: “In some cases the state
has to offer funds for the reconstruction of
houses destroyed during a flood not in the same
place but after moving them into a flood safe
area.“ (GW, 21 May 2010)
management, had already been discussed in 1992 after a
significant fire accident. Back then, actions had been taken to
enhance the operational capacities of the state fire brigades.
However, the flood event of 1997 emphasized shortcomings and
delays, thereby reviving the idea of administrative reform. As a
consequence, crisis management was reformed and further
institutionalized, affecting all dimensions of the PAA (see Table
9).
Second shock event: flood of 2010
Even though the next major flood, that of 2010, brought similar
losses of about €3 billion, it was not considered as serious an event
as the one in 1997, partly because it caused fewer fatalities. After
1997, the organization of crisis response was improved, so that
there was more space for other arguments to be raised.
Furthermore, additional actor coalitions have been given a voice
in the framing contest; environmental NGOs that were not present
in the discussions following the flood of 1997 have now become
active. Newspaper articles referring to the shock event of 2010
were mostly concentrated on three frames: prodike strengthening;
improvement of spatial planning; and ecosystem-based
management approaches (Table 10).  
Members of Parliament and water managers adopted, again, the
prodike strengthening frame. They blamed the poor condition of
the dikes, and asked for increased investment in structural defense
measures and new legislation. Although after the flood of 1997
large programs in this sphere were launched, e.g., Program for the
River Odra 2006, they still suffered from poor coordination and
underinvestment. There was a conflict of interests between public
water managers, i.e., Regional Water Management Boards, that
planned to build certain structures and local communities that
did not agree that they had to leave their houses. This caused delay,
especially in Racibórz, Wielowieś Klasztorna or Świnna Poręba.
High executive politicians, e.g., Bronisław Komorowski, Marshall
of Sejm, proposed changes in legislation that would enable water
managers to expropriate land. The new legislation was introduced
at short notice. The resonance of the frame was high because the
flood coincided with the presidential elections. Politicians wanted
to present solutions, and hydro-technical measures were still the
solution that was the most taken for granted. The institutional
consequences were directly related to an increased availability of
financial means (Table 11).  
Representatives of Regional Water Management Boards
emphasized the problem of risk awareness and blamed the citizens
for building in flood-prone areas (spatial planning frame). They
proposed measures to prevent the occupation of flood-prone
areas. The resonance of the frame was increased because it was
extended to a general problem of the whole spatial planning
system. The spatial planning system was criticized as ineffective,
mainly because of the weak position of municipalities. As an
institutional consequence, the Water Act was amended with
intensive support from politicians. Municipalities became obliged
to take flood risk into consideration, which did not always align
with their financial interest to expand economically (Table 11).
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Table 11. Institutional consequences after the flood of 2010. PAA
= policy arrangement approach.
 
Dimensions
PAA
First response Second response
Discourses Hydro-technical
discourse still
dominant
Ecosystem-based solutions gained
attention, in connection with spatial
planning, which also gained in
importance and acceptance
Rules Right to
expropriate
Legal demand for municipalities to
consider flood risk in spatial plans
Actors No change Increased cooperation but also
conflict between water managers and
environmentalists
Resources Increased budget Ad hoc investments in eco-
infrastructural projects
NGOs, in particular the World Wide Fund, adopted the
ecosystem-based approach frame. They stressed the negative
influences of human activity on nature, e.g., through building
dikes. They argued that dikes should be relocated or demolished
to give more space to the rivers and let them return to their natural
state. The resonance of the frame was relatively high because it
could be bridged to the proenvironmental discourse that was
supported by the EU, which Poland joined in 2004. The frame
should have been implemented through spatial planning by
identifying future flood risk zones. However, a broad scheme was
lacking and projects were implemented ad hoc; this was made
worse by increased antagonism between environmental NGOs
and traditional water managers. One successful project was an
NGO proposal that could be realized in cooperation with water
administration bodies (Domaszków-Tarchalice polder). However,
this was rather an exception; often there are conflicts that delay
the management process.
Persistence of policy consequences
The changes in crisis management that succeeded the flood of
1997 persisted. Crisis management was reformed, which led to
permanently institutionalized structures, e.g., the Act on Crisis
Management 2007, with sufficient funding, political support, and
effective response activities, i.e., a shift toward the preparation
strategy. The defense strategy was strengthened by receiving more
financial investments. However, the organization of the strategy
remained unchanged, in terms of the actors involved in FRM,
the central mode of financing, and the influential role of
politicians. After the shock wave declined, so did the political
commitment to financially invest in the defence strategy; as a
result, the infrastructure was only marginally improved. The
defense strategy was neither permanently strengthened nor
institutionally reformed.  
The flood of 2010 had less policy effect than the flood of 1997,
partially because of the lower number of fatalities (16 people;
Choryński et al. 2012). Contrary to the crisis management frame
of 1997, which was bridged to an administrative reform of
decentralization, the spatial planning and ecosystem-based
approach of 2010 have not brought change into prioritizing
economic development. At the moment, we cannot make any
statements about long-term consequences; however, adjustments
to spatial planning and the trend toward a more proenvironmental
approach are still ongoing, but slowly.
DISCUSSION
Previously, we explained that there are a number of similarities
between both countries, for example, regarding flood defense as
a dominant strategy, hydro-engineering expertise, and the
dominant role of state involvement. Differences are to be found
in the level of resource availability and the way people look at
FRM in the Netherlands and in Poland. Consequently, the
framing of flood events differs (Table 12). We compare how the
shock events were received and framed by different actors, and
consider what can be said about corresponding policy change in
the long run.
Table 12. Main points of comparison between the Netherlands
and Poland. FRGA = flood risk governance arrangement.
 
The Netherlands Poland
FRGA before the flood event
Structural defense approach:
institutionalization = evolved
Structural defense approach:
institutionalization = fragmented
Dominant frames 1st event
Additional study
prostructural measures
Spatial planning shortcoming
Prostructural measures
Crisis management
Decentralization
Dominant frames 2nd event
Prostructural measures
Prevention through spatial planning
Ecosystem-based approach
Institutional consequences
Procedural streamlining of
structural defense approach
(1995)
Temporary financial support of
flood defense (1997, 2010)
Temporary adjustment of
defense approach (ecosystem-
based; 1995)
Persistent shift toward flood
preparation strategy (1997)
Minimal (and temporary) shift
toward flood prevention
strategy (1995)
First, the flood events have a different societal impact. In the
Netherlands, the reactions to the event of 1993 were limited in
comparison with the reactions to the second event. It was the
occurrence of two consecutive floods with potentially disastrous
consequences that brought into focus the vulnerability of the
country, especially in light of climate change. As Rosenthal (1988)
explains, the effect was increased because Dutch citizens normally
feel invulnerable because of the high protection standards. In
Poland, on the other hand, the flood of 1997 created bigger shock
waves than in 2010, because of the less organized evacuation
action taken during the flood and a higher number of fatalities.
Second, in Poland, the wider public blamed above all the
government for the lack of structural measures, whereas, in the
Netherlands, the environmental interest groups were blamed for
delaying structural dike strengthening, and to a lesser degree
spatial planning authorities were also considered to be culpable.
Third, the corresponding institutional consequences show
similarities, as well as differences, depending on the shock wave
and the time that has passed after the event. In both countries,
we see that shock events can increase the political and societal
awareness of flood risk and its management (window of
opportunity). As a result, shock events increase the receptiveness
for different frames among a broader set of actors, which can lead
to different institutional effects. In both countries, the immediate
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reaction was to strengthen flood defense in the Netherlands by
streamlining the procedure and in Poland by providing more
financial resources. That indicates that in the short term the shock
event caused actually a strengthening of the trusted defense
approach, which aligns with findings of previous research
(Driessen and De Gier 1999). From a framing perspective, one
explanation may be that actors who support the existing approach
can quickly develop and disseminate their frame because of their
established expert position that gives them access to media and
political circles. Furthermore, the existing approach offers a
familiar reference system for politicians and citizens, so that the
wider public understands it and feels comforted by the immediate
action; particularly in the Netherlands flood safety can be seen
as an important overarching public interest.  
Our findings suggest that frames that deviate from the traditional
management approach need longer to develop and to spread in
the right circles. Therefore, they seem more likely to generate
midterm policy responses. In the Netherlands, those midterm
policy responses have consisted of an adjustment of the defense
strategy toward a more ecosystem-based approach and to a lesser
degree an increased consideration of spatial planning in terms of
prevention mainly to support the ecosystem-based approach,
confirming earlier research (Van der Brugge et al. 2005, Huitema
and Meijerink 2007). In Poland, we see a clear broadening of
strategies toward preparation and response. How can those
differences be explained? On the one hand, the discourse
opportunity structure differed, which increased the resonance of
different frames. On the other hand, in the Netherlands the
defense approach was highly institutionalized and stabilized.
Additionally, the existing organizational structures were hardly
challenged because the defense approach successfully prevented
a more severe catastrophe: the dikes held. That legitimized flood
defense and the idea of controlling water, which is still the
underlying notion of the ecosystem-based approach. It led to a
compromise of the two opposing frames. Whereas in Poland the
defense approach was less institutionalized and its organizational
structures were challenged, because it was not successful: dikes
had breached, people had died. Flood defense lost legitimacy and
a new strategy, in line with the discursive opportunity structure,
was developed with the aim of preventing fatalities, not
completely substituting but compensating the shortcomings of
the defense approach. This strategy was relatively effective during
the 2010 flood event so that the shock wave of the event was
limited. Nevertheless, ideas of an ecosystem-based approach had
become popular in Poland in 2010. A reason could be the
accession of Poland to the EU in 2004. The Water Framework
Directive (2000) supports ecosystem-based ideas. That suggests
that EU directives could create discourse opportunity structures.
The ecosystem-based approach is in the developmental phase, but
not yet institutionalized, because it has been difficult for engineers
and environmentalists to reach consensus and share resources.  
How persistent is the policy change? Once the shock waves have
subsided, the windows of opportunity have closed, and the
discursive opportunity structures have changed, the financial and
political commitment is often reduced, because the political
stream focuses on other priorities again. We see this in Poland
with flood defense, which lost financial priority once the shock
waves decreased and other fields needed financial investment. In
contrast, the strategy of preparation, which needs less financial
investment and is additionally supported by local citizens and
governments, is permanently institutionalized and until now it
has remained uncontested. In the Netherlands as well, financial
support for the ecosystem-based approach has been reduced. It
also lost political support because of a shift to a more conservative
government, i.e., changes in the discourse opportunity structure.
In the meantime, however, the structural flood defense approach
was still highly institutionalized, which means it had remained
stable and technical water managers had preserved its influence
and power. As the discursive opportunity structure had changed,
which was supported by the economic crisis, the technical water
managers could again advance the popularity of the more cost-
efficient structural defense approach. These observations imply
that long-term institutional change is dependent on resource
availability, and the prioritization of resource allocation, and also
on the evolution and degree of institutionalization of the initial
management approach.  
Interpretative studies are normally characterized by a high degree
of internal validity. We analyzed the endogenous processes in a
comprehensive way taking many explanatory factors into
consideration. In our research, these factors need to be reported
in the media or the policy documents; however, there is always a
chance that unreported explanatory factors were also influential,
or factors that were not connected to the shock event. Therefore,
we can only identify corresponding institutional dynamics, not
causal relationships.  
We acknowledge that the scope of our analysis is limited. We
focused on dominant, national frames and formal institutional
changes; that means that frames of a regional scope or frames
that caused informal change were not considered. Furthermore,
it is likely that not all frames are presented in the media; there
might even be an intentional bias that only some frames are
reported. We tried to counteract this by choosing newspapers of
different political orientations. Therefore, we think that our
approach is appropriate in relation to our initial aim, i.e., to
analyze endogenous institutional processes.
CONCLUSION
What are the further insights on the relationship between shock
events and the initiated institutional dynamics on increasing
societal resilience? In the case of the Netherlands and the events
of 1993 and 1995, the first response was to “recover and return”
by slightly adjusting existing procedures. In terms of resilience
that increased the capacity to resist. Even though financial
support for the ecosystem-based approach decreased after a while,
the involvement of a wider set of actors and the slow increase of
awareness for flood issues as well as environmental values
remained and is generally seen as beneficial for resilience (Van
Herk et al. 2015).  
In Poland, the shock event of 1997 put the flood problem on the
political agenda. It showed the shortcomings of the existing
defense approach, i.e., the lack of systematic financing, and
triggered the development of emergency management, which
reduced the fatalities in the flood of 2010, at least to some extent.
It increased resilience, i.e., the ability to absorb and recover.
However, the shock event did not cause fundamental
improvements to the structural defense strategy, but only
additional short-term financial investment. River-widening
measures have been discussed since the flood of 2010; however,
at the moment their implementation is rather ad hoc. Discussions
between environmentalists and water engineers sometimes inhibit
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the effective implementation of projects and, therefore, might
even slightly hamper resilience.  
Our research suggests that shock events, such as floods, show the
shortcomings of FRGAs by bringing the risk into focus. They
open up institutional arrangements and make them more
susceptible to change. Shock events test the capacity to resist and
bounce back, thus giving opportunities for adapting and learning.
The research suggests that the direction of change accelerated by
a shock event is dependent on the actors and the frames they
introduce, and their ability to increase the resonance of the frame.
This resonance can be increased (and decreased) by the discursive
opportunity structure and the existing FRGA that stabilizes
certain legislation and the power position of actors. Furthermore,
the permanence of change seems to be especially influenced by
the availability of resources, or the willingness to allocate
resources, as well as the evolution of the existing FRGA.  
Hence, it can be assumed that a shock event can facilitate a shift
toward different forms of resilience. A shock event can increase
resilience by either accelerating a diversification of strategies (see
Poland) or an adaptation of the dominant existing strategy (see
the Netherlands). In Poland the flood events have led to increased
attention for strengthening the strategies that are connected to
“absorb and recover” whereas in The Netherlands it has mostly
led to increased investments in the “capacity to resist,” in terms
of resilience of the engineering-based infrastructural system.
Although there is political awareness of the need to bring back
historical societal resilience in terms of resilience of citizens and
communities, this is hardly translated in changes of resources for
flood risk strategies in the direction of “absorb and recover,” e.g.,
the flood risk awareness among citizens remains low (OECD
2014). Thus, peoples’ resilience is not reintroduced. Furthermore,
resilience might also be hampered if  conflicting frames fail to
achieve a resolution, as is partly the case in Poland with the
struggle between environmental organizations and water
managers. Shock events open up the possibility to increase
resilience, but it is dependent on the context as to how far resilience
is increased.  
Our analysis allowed us to estimate and analyze the resonance of
frames, by providing information about alignment strategies and
discursive opportunity structures. For the Polish case, the research
seems to have generated some new insights because little research
was previously being conducted. However, for the Dutch case as
well, we could extend existing research (e.g., Driessen and De Gier
1999, Van der Brugge et al. 2005, Huitema and Meijerink 2007,
Van Herk et al. 2015) by refining the interrelation between shock
events, framing, and institutional change through an analysis of
the endogenous processes. We analyzed why some frames generate
institutional stability or change and subsequently why this change
was more permanent or not. These insights are not automatically
generalizable to other contexts, but it is likely that similar
processes play a role and influence the effects of frames. Further
research would be necessary to test this and to analyze the effect
on an even longer time frame.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/8764
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